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VOLUME LXIX, Number 3

March 2016

 

Self-Determination in Logic and Reality, RICHARD DIEN WINFIELD

From the beginnings of philosophical investigation, there has been widespread recognition that reason must be autonomous to think the truth and that philosophy must be the freest of all disciplines.  Nonetheless, conceiving how self-determination can be in thought and reality seems to pose insurmountable challenges.  The essay shows how these challenges can be met, explaining how the nature of the concept enables reason to be autonomous, how nature can give rise to animal life, providing the enabling conditions for linguistic intelligence, how the psychological and cultural conditions of discourse leave it free, and how conduct can achieve self-determination in the intersubjective exercise of institutionalized rights.

Aristotle on Parts of Time and Being in Time, NATHANAEL STEIN

Aristotle opens his discussion of time in Physics 4.10-14 with a puzzle, an argument which purports to show that time does not exist, since its only parts – the past and future – do not exist. He does not discuss the puzzle again, and so we are left with the question of how he would or could solve it. A full solution would involve not only a justification of realism about time, but also an account of why the puzzle arises, what must be corrected to prevent it from arising, and how much of our pre-theoretical picture of time survives these adjustments. This paper argues that we can provide such a solution by (i) distinguishing between two ways of being committed to the reality of past, present, and future, and (ii) examining Aristotle’s remarks in Physics 4.12 on the notions of being in time and being surrounded by time.

The Triplex Via of Naming God, FRAN O’ROURKE

Aquinas on Testimonial Justification, MATTHEW KENT SIEBERT

According to David Hume, testimonial belief is justified inferentially; according to Thomas Reid, by contrast, testimonial belief has justification by default. Aquinas’s approach is different. This article explains the importance of various kinds of testimonial belief in Aquinas, and argues that his account of testimonial justification is a pluralist one: testimonial ‘opinion’ is justified inferentially, while testimonial ‘faith’ is justified by one’s attitude toward the speaker. When one has faith in this restricted sense, one believes the speaker’s statement in order to ‘adhere’ to the speaker, with a special act of will, and typically for the reason that the speaker is truthful. The article concludes with some comments on the characteristics and advantages of Aquinas’s account that distinguish it from recent accounts of testimonial justification.

Kierkegaard’s Don Giovanni and the Seductions of the Inner Ear, ANTÓN BARBA-KAY

The author means to show how focusing on the sense of hearing can sharpen our understanding of Kierkegaard’s argument – in the first portion of Either/Or – that Don Giovanni ranks supreme among works of art. After explaining how he takes Kierkegaard’s case to rest on the issue of the ear being the “most spiritually qualified sense,” he shows how attending to the importance of hearing within the original Don Juan myth, as well as within Mozart and Da Ponte’s treatment of it, can help us understand the myth’s dependence on and repudiation of Christianity: unlike sight, hearing places us in close spiritual intimacy with its source, even as it also opens up specific possibilities of theatricality and deceit. He concludes by arguing why hearing should be regarded as the paradigmatic sense in relation to which Kierkegaard understands the task of philosophy itself, in contrast to earlier philosophical emphases on visible intelligibility.

Last Updated ( Thursday, 25 February 2016 19:20 )